plan consists of conducting tests only on the modules that comprise the system, and in order to draw inferences on the system reliability it uses the mathematical model that relates the system reliability to the component reliabilities and the operational profile. In essence, we ask the following question: "assuming that the particular Markov model is an accurate representation of the software system, what is the minimum level of testing that should be performed on each module so that the probability of reaching a wrong conclusion is less than a specified small fraction?" We have previously considered such similar "design" problems in a hardware system framework for component tests when the objective is to make inference on system reliability. This work has covered several different system configurations under several different modes of sampling (e.g. [5] , [6] , [7] ), but this approach has never been applied to software systems. This paper represents a first effort in this direction and an attempt to carry over the ideas that we have developed earlier for system-based component tests to the area of software reliability testing.
In summary, this paper addresses operational testing at the module level. It uses a Markov model of the transfer of control between modules in order to compute the system reliability. The approach presented here is based strictly on classical statistics (as opposed to a Bayesian framework) and also assumes that module interactions do not affect system failure. In other words it assumes that there is no failure when transitioning between modules, and that when the software system operates an individual module does not influence the failure of another. In the following sections, we first present a brief discussion of software reliability testing and overview some of the statistical models developed for this purpose that are relevant to the work contained herein. This is followed by the development of the actual test plans that result in a two-stage mathematical programming formulation. A cutting-plane algorithm [8] is developed for this formulation and the entire procedure is illustrated via numerical examples.
SOFTWARE TESTING
As proposed in [4] , a software system is defined here as a "collection of programs and system files such that the system files are accessed and altered only by the programs in the collection." Each element in this collection will be called a module -for instance, a module might be a program, a subprogram, or a file. The performance (and hence the reliability) of the system clearly depends on that of each of the constituent modules, as well as on the relationship between these modules and the system; in this regard a software system is not that much different from any other type of system. However, unlike other systems the actual relationship between system and module reliabilities is quite unique and depends on the specific definition of software reliability as well as on the structure of the overall system. This point is addressed in the next section.
Testing takes place almost continuously throughout the developmental life-cycle of a software system. There are distinct types of tests associated with different phases, e.g., design-based tests, structural (or white-box) tests, functional (or black-box) tests, debug tests, operational tests, feature tests, and load tests. This paper focuses on operational testing; the interested reader is referred to [9] or [10] for more details on testing as a part of the software development cycle. A comparison of the operational testing procedure versus debug testing insofar as their ability to deliver reliability in the final product is given in [1] . Although no clear-cut winner emerges in this discussion, the authors point out several advantages that operational testing possesses.
The advantages of modular testing are emphasized in [2] as well as [4] . With software development it is usually the case that most nontrivial systems are developed by a large team of programmers and software engineers, as opposed to a single individual or group. Often, responsibility for different pieces of a software system is assigned to different organizational entities at different locations and at different points in time.
While testing of the complete system is essential, it stands to reason that a sound and well-planned program of testing at the module level has the potential to reduce the effort involved in system level testing. Modular testing also allows for more flexibility since it can be done at different times and locations. However, a key point to be kept in mind is that the test plans for the individual modules must be system-based, and designed in such a way that statistically valid inferences may be drawn about the overall system from the results of module tests.
Markov models have been presented by Cheung [3] as well as Littlewood [11] to describe the switching that takes place between modules or sub-systems within a software system. In the latter paper, the author also considers the failure caused by the "interfaces" between any two modules, that is, those failures that are introduced when subsystems are put together in a larger system. In [12] , the authors investigate the effects of shared use on the reliability of modular software. For this purpose they model the distribution of user demands at the module level by a continuous time Markov chain which is referred to as the operational profile.
In [13] the authors address the problem of estimating software reliability from data on component failures by using a Bayesian framework. While this work is related to ours, it differs in that we approach the problem from the classical statistical perspective of drawing inferences on system reliability.
In particular, we formulate a design problem for the testing of modules in terms of classical statistical concepts related to testing of hypothesis in a strictly non-Bayesian framework. The objective is to use the results from only the modular tests to make inferences on the overall software reliability.
For the sake of simplicity, we also do not model the possibility of failures in the interfaces among the modules or module interactions. However, in earlier work on "hardware" systems we have explicitly modeled interface failures [14] , and we believe that this extension can be achieved by modifying the software reliability model to include a combination of modular and system testing.
In looking at the test design problem, Cheung [3] develops a sensitivity coefficient for each module that captured its effect on the system's reliability. Testing is then advocated by concentrating on the modules with the largest values of these coefficients.
However, this work does not present any precise numbers or methodology to derive the exact amount of test effort. Using the same model, the authors in [4] suggest allocating the targeted system reliability goal among the components and then testing the individual components to verify whether the component reliabilities meet the allocated goals at a specified level of confidence. However, this procedure does not consider the system configuration any longer once the reliability goal has been allocated. As discussed in [15] , this method may lead to erroneous estimates of sample size requirements for component testing.
To approach the problem of drawing statistically valid inferences about a system based on tests of its constituent modules, one requires a mathematical model that expresses software system reliability in terms of the module reliabilities. Using the model proposed in [3] , we follow the approach of system-based component testing that was first described in [16] . For a full discussion of system-based component test plans and the issues involved, the reader is referred to [15] .
SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Reliability of a software system can be defined in a fashion similar to that of hardware or any general system. It may be viewed as a function of time, in which case it is the probability of failure-free operation for some specified mission time under specific conditions. Alternatively, it may be viewed from the perspective of general use on a variety of different inputs, in which case it is the probability that it will correctly process a randomly chosen input. With the emphasis on reuse this latter viewpoint is generally more useful, and is the one that we consider in this paper. Given that the precise nature of the application on which some general-purpose software system will be used is not known in advance, one must quantify software use by defining a suitable distribution or operational profile. Essentially, one may view this as a description of possible inputs to the software along with the relative frequency with which each input might be encountered, or equivalently, the probability that the input will be encountered in a randomly chosen trial. The operational profile and the program structure allow us to develop a statistical distribution of inputs for each individual module and in the modular testing procedure being considered here we will use inputs that are randomly selected from this distribution.
Associated with each type of input to the system there is a specific path, or sequence of modules over which control is transferred by the system. The model proposed in [3] is based on the assumption that transfer of control between the individual modules of a software system takes place according to a Markov chain. In essence, the probability p ij that control transfers from module i to another module j is independent of how module i was entered. It is assumed that there are n such modules within the system where module 1 represents the initial state (e.g., this could be the main program called by the user). It is also assumed that when the program is successfully completed, control is transferred to a terminal module S (e.g., this could be the operating system) with probability p iS of being entered from state i. Note that . 1
The probabilities defined above represent values for a completely reliable system.
Since we consider a system that is presumably not so, it is assumed that each module in the system has faults and that module i has reliability r i , i.e., P(system fails any time control enters module i) = (1-r i ). To model the system an additional state F is now defined. This state represents program failure and since each module is assumed to be not one hundred percent reliable,, it follows that this state can be entered from any module. Also note that unlike the transient states 1,2,…,n, the states S and F are absorbing states and represent (respectively) successful completion of the program and failure. The Markov chain thus has n+2 states and a transition matrix Q where q ij = r i p ij for i=1,2,…,n and j=1,2,…,n,S; q iF = 1-r i for i=1,2,…,n; and q FF =q SS =1, with all other q ij =0. As an example consider the system given in Figure 1 ; the transition matrix Q corresponding to this system is given by 
The assumption made in this work is similar to that in earlier work ( [3] , [4] , [18] ); the p ij values are known but the r i 's will in general be unknown. The assumption that the p ij are known is based on the fact that the operational profile provides the probability of encountering a specific input, and the logic of the software provides the specific path of modules through which control is transferred for that input. Thus one may compute the probability that control transfers from module i to module j for some random input.
Clearly, this probability depends on the operational profile. Thus one must pay special attention to the development of the operational profile, and the approach proposed in this paper is accurate as long as the operational profile is accurate. However, this is in general true whenever a statistical approach is used to test software; this point is also discussed at length by Musa et al. [9] . If the operational profile changes over time one would have to recompute the probabilities p ij for the new profile, but the formulae used to compute these would be identical to the ones used initially as long as the software itself is not altered. While it is thus reasonable to assume that the p ij 's could be estimated for a given operation profile, it would not be correct to assume that the reliability values (r i )
will be known for individual modules. Indeed, if these values were known, there would not be any reason to conduct the reliability tests.
It should be mentioned that this method of computing the reliability expression as given in (1) can be quite inconvenient without the use of software that can perform the requisite symbolic linear algebra, although packages such as Mathematica [19] , which was used in this paper, make this very easy to do. An alternative approach to computing system reliability for the Markovian model was proposed by Siegrist [18] . This approach uses conditional probability arguments and dispenses with the need to invert matrices, and using this approach the author also provided closed-form expressions for certain special types of software systems.
A MODULAR TEST PLAN
Given that we can compute the reliability of a software system using the approach described in the preceding section we now develop a procedure for drawing inferences on system reliability by tests on its individual modules. The procedure followed is to run k i unit tests on module i where each test uses input data drawn randomly from the use distribution. The values of k i , i=1,2,…,n are to be determined. Let X i denote the number of failures observed among the k i test instances of module i. It is assumed that X 1 , X 2 ,…, X n are mutually independent random variables. The following rule is then used for the overall system: "Infer that the system is reliable as long as Σ i X i = 0." Gal [16] proposed this rule for general systems. It is a reasonable rule for establishing software reliability, because as soon as a failure occurs, presumably every effort will be made thereafter to remove the fault that caused the failure. In designing the test plan the objective is to find the smallest values for k i (i.e., to minimize test effort) which ensure that the plan will rarely infer as reliable a system whose reliability is below some minimally acceptable value, say R 0 . Specifically, we would like to ensure that the probability of the plan accepting a system with reliability R S ≤ R 0 to be below some specified small fraction β.
Note that with inputs drawn at random from the use distribution, the proposed test Thus the probability that the proposed test plan infers that the system is reliable is given by P(∑ i X i =0) = exp(-(∑ i k i (1-r i ) ). The problem of designing a test plan may now be stated as follows:
Minimize k 1 +k 2 +…+k n subject to
Note that we use R S (r) to denote the reliability of the system as a function of the module reliabilities contained in the vector r and that R S (r) is computed via Equation (1) of the previous section. Also note that there are infinitely many nonnegative vectors r for which R S (r)≤R 0 and the constraint specified in (2) must hold for each of these. Thus the optimization problem is an integer linear program with infinitely many constraints (also referred to as a semi-infinite integer linear program). However, not all of these constraints are going to be active at the optimum, so that our interest is in generating only those vectors r that are likely to yield active constraints in the above program. In order to solve the problem we make the observation that (2) is equivalent to solving the following sub-problem:
and requiring that its optimum value be ≥ -ln (β). Thus the overall optimization problem may be rewritten as the following two-stage mathematical program:
k i ≥0 and integer for i=1,2,…,n.
In the "inner" stage we fix the values of k i and solve a problem in the r i ; this problem has a linear objective but a nonlinear constraint in addition to simple upper and lower bounds on the r i . In the "outer" problem we solve a linear program in the nonnegative integers k i .
Thus the overall problem is to find from among all the values of k=[k 1 , k 2 ,…, k n ] for which the inner problem yields an optimum value that is ≥ -ln (β), the particular vector for which Σ i k i is minimized.
A SOLUTION STRATEGY FOR THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We now describe a cutting plane algorithm for solving this problem. In order to simplify the procedure the integer restrictions on k i will be ignored and the optimum continuous solution will be rounded up to obtain the final values for k i . Clearly, this solution is guaranteed to be feasible, and if the optimal values are large any resulting deviation from the optimum will be negligible. ≥ -ln (β) then stop; the current vector k is optimal. Otherwise proceed to Step 2. solve. However, the reliability function R S (r) involves only polynomial terms and it may be rearranged so that the subproblem is restated as a signomial geometric program [20] , for which efficient algorithms have been developed. We have used an efficient adaptation [21] of an algorithm originally described in [22] , which solves such problems by solving a sequence of posynomial geometric programs.
Note that in
Step 0, we effectively assume that all modules except module i are perfect and then find the value of the maximum reliability for module i which would still render the system unreliable (thus, if r i is above this value the system is reliable and if r i is below this value then it is not). This procedure is repeated in turn for each i. Clearly, each of these vectors satisfies the constraints of the subproblem specified in the LHS of (4) and thus generates a valid constraint for the main problem. For the problems that we tested the optimal values of k tended to be very close to this initial vector, and one heuristic alternative might be to dispense with the (hard-to-solve) subproblem altogether and adopt this vector k. However, more testing with various values of R 0 and β are required to draw any definitive conclusions about the quality of this solution.
NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
Example 1: Consider the sequential system pictured in Figure 2 which was motivated by a radar software system discussed in [23] and presented in [18] . We consider values of 0.95 for R 0 and 0.05 for β. The reliability R S for this system derived using the procedure in Section 2 yields Rounding up, we would thus test 2,565 random inputs on the first module, 858 on the second, and 289 on the third, and the system would be accepted as reliable as long as we observe no failures from these tests.
Example 2: For a larger example, consider the system represented in Figure 3 , which is based on an example presented in [4] . This software system has a total of 12 modules with the transition probabilities as given by the numbers alongside the respective arcs.
When the procedure of Section 2 was used to compute the reliability of this system and the constraint R s (r)≤R 0 rearranged, the resulting expression yielded a polynomial of order 10 with a total of 170 terms; the exact expression for system reliability is not reported on account of its size, but is available from the authors. The expression for reliability was computed using Mathematica. Once again, the procedure discussed earlier was used to [4] . In other words, this example suggests that the relative testing effort may be directly proportional to the degree of sensitivity exhibited by the system reliability towards each module, which is an intuitively appealing result.
However, at this stage, this remains only a conjecture that is based on the results for a few particular systems. In any event, the actual number of test cases must of course, be determined by solving the problem formulated herein.
CONCLUSIONS
Using a particular Markov model for software reliability we have provided a procedure for finding the minimum number of test cases required for the different modules such that there is no more than a small prespecified probability of accepting a software system whose reliability is less than a prescribed value. It is worth mentioning that since the required number of tests is based on the assumption that the software will not be accepted if even a single failure occurs in the module tests, the procedure is likely to yield results that are quite stringent in character. Our approach does not account for "module interactions." Differences between the reliability of subsystems in isolation and when operating within the complete system may arise even if no failure occurs during a
transition. An extension of the work contained herein will need to investigate this possibility.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that if the cost of testing were different from one module to the other, this would be easy to incorporate into our solution procedure. 
